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Question: How have theorists and empirical researchers treated the
human tendency to avoid discomforting information?
Data Sources: A historical review (1890–2004) of theory literature in
communication and information studies, coupled with searches of
recent studies on uptake of genetic testing and on coping strategies of
cancer patients, was performed.
Study Selection: The authors’ review of the recent literature included
searches of the MEDLINE, PsychInfo, and CINAHL databases between
1992 and summer of 2004 and selective, manual searches of earlier
literature. Search strategies included the following subject headings and
key words: MeSH headings: Genetic Screening/psychology, Decision
Making, Neoplasms/diagnosis/genetics/psychology; CINAHL
headings: Genetic Screening, Genetic Counseling, Anxiety, Decision
Making, Decision Making/Patient; additional key words: avoidance,
worry, monitoring, blunting, cancer. The ‘‘Related Articles’’ function in
MEDLINE was used to perform additional ‘‘citation pearl’’ searching.
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Main Results: The assumption that individuals actively seek
information underlies much of psychological theory and communication
practice, as well as most models of the information-seeking process.
However, much research has also noted that sometimes people avoid
information, if paying attention to it will cause mental discomfort or
dissonance. Cancer information in general and genetic screening for
cancer in particular are discussed as examples to illustrate this pattern.
Conclusion: That some patients avoid knowledge of imminent disease
makes avoidance behavior an important area for social and
psychological research, particularly with regard to genetic testing.

INTRODUCTION
Beyond obsessions, curiosity, and creativity, lies a host
of motivations not to seek information.
Johnson [1]

Many early studies of communication, whether of
mass or interpersonal communication, have assumed
that individuals seek, or at least pay some attention to,
sources of information. This assumption is deeply embedded in Western culture, at least as far back as Aristotle’s statement that ‘‘all men, by nature, desire to
know’’ (circa 330 BC) [2]. For this reason perhaps, the
emphasis in research on communication and on information seeking has been on active acquisition of information (e.g., in Lasswell’s 1948 characterization of
‘‘surveillance of the environment’’ as being one of the
‘‘three functions of communication’’ [3]).
Most discussions of information seeking also focus
on the benefits of acquiring data. Many models of the
information-seeking process (e.g., Ellis [4], Kuhlthau
[5], and Wilson [6]) do not even consider that information seeking may not take place in cases in which
people recognize their ignorance about a topic. As in
Aristotle’s time, it is assumed that people want to know;
looking for information is a natural aspect of being
human.
Yet, it has also long been noted that people may avoid
information, if paying attention to it will cause mental
discomfort or dissonance. As Maslow once put it: ‘‘we
can seek knowledge in order to reduce anxiety and we
can also avoid knowing in order to reduce anxiety’’
[7]. He recognized that sometimes we would rather not
know that we are at high risk for a disease or disaster—a tendency familiar to communication researchers, especially those involved in information campaigns, as well as health information professionals and
researchers.
The tendency to avoid, ignore, or deny information
has always been somewhat of an anomaly in human
behavior. How have communication theories and information-seeking models dealt with it? The idea of
‘‘selecting’’ messages naturally emphasizes the information that is selected, not that which is ignored. The
* Based on a paper presented at the Fifty-second Annual Conference
of the International Communication Association; Seoul, Korea; July
2002.
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authors are interested in the latter in this paper. In
addressing this issue, we first examine the evolution
of relevant concepts and theories and then explore
how some information-seeking models incorporate the
notion of avoiding information.
THE EVOLUTION FROM SELECTION TO
REJECTION
The notion of avoiding information has a long history
in the communication literature and a much longer one
in the discipline of psychology. Perhaps as far back as
James’s writings on will and attention [8] and certainly
in Freud’s theories about psychological defenses (repression, suppression, and denial) [9], psychologists
have discussed the tendency of humans to allow uncomfortable thoughts or memories to slip away. An
early characterization of avoidance was that of an intentional selection of some stimuli rather than others.
Hyman and Sheatsley’s ‘‘selective exposure’’ (1947)
[10] has been cited as a reason why attempts to use
the mass media to change attitudes or behavior (e.g.,
in health promotion campaigns) sometimes fail. They
characterized some people as ‘‘chronically uninformed’’ and ‘‘hard to reach.’’
On the basis of their studies, Hyman and Sheatsley
observed that humans tend to seek information that is
congruent with their prior knowledge, beliefs, and
opinions and to avoid exposure to information that
conflicts with those internal states. The hypothesized
need for ‘‘consistency’’ (in thought and perhaps in
emotion) also contributed to the growing research
(now close to a thousand studies) on ‘‘cognitive dissonance’’ [11]. Festinger’s ideas about avoiding dissonance were rooted in theories of social comparison
(i.e., the tendency to evaluate oneself through comparisons with the abilities, achievements, and opinions of
others), a stream of thought that continues in psychology (e.g., Trope [12] and Swann [13]). Festinger
had demonstrated that under certain circumstances
people prefer to seek out information consonant with
their knowledge. Later experiments by Frey [14]
showed that such preferences differ by whether the situation is serious and whether those involved have an
opportunity to do something about it. In general, if
nothing can be done to change an outcome, people
have a greater willingness to deal with dissonant information.
J Med Libr Assoc 93(3) July 2005
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Research on ‘‘fear appeals’’ considered another possibility: purposeful rejection of information. In 1953,
Janis and Feshback [15] found that extreme attempts
to frighten people into practicing good dental hygiene,
by showing them pictures of mouth cancer and deformed teeth, were not very effective. They hypothesized that such strong arousals lead an audience to
‘‘ignore’’ the threat, whereas milder portrayals are better at leading them to confront the underlying problem. Information about possible threats creates tensions in the minds of audience members, who must in
turn find some way to resolve the tension. If the threat
is extreme, or if any potential responses are not expected to be effective, then an attractive alternative is
to ignore the threat entirely, which in turn promotes
consistency. A key consideration, then, is the mechanism by which people evaluate messages [16].
One unsettled issue regarding avoidance is the degree to which it is triggered by the situation that a
person faced, as opposed to a trait that a person possessed permanently. Rokeach [17] saw it as a tendency
for people to have either an ‘‘open’’ or a ‘‘closed’’
mind. Those with an open mind were more likely to
approach new information than to avoid it [18]. Seeing
avoidance as a trait found new adherents in the 1980s,
when psychologists interested in coping behaviors developed a related typology that addressed the emotional component of threatening information. Information-seeking styles were characterized as either
‘‘monitoring’’ or ‘‘blunting’’ [19, 20]. Individuals who
are monitors scan the environment for threats; individuals who are blunters tend to avoid threatening information or distract themselves from it [21]. As many
as one-third of patients choose to distract themselves
when faced with threats they see as uncontrollable [21,
22].
Since the 1980s, instruments have been developed to
measure coping behavior, in particular the degrees of
hypothesized monitoring and blunting among patients
and other subjects [23–25]. The most widely used instrument, the Monitor/Blunter Style Scale (MBSS),
poses four scenarios (one directly health care related),
each accompanied by eight statements that respondents check if they agree with them. Examples of
blunting statements include ‘‘I would try to sleep’’ and
‘‘I would go to the movies to take my mind off
things.’’ An article by Rees and Bath [26] reviews implementations of the scales and questions the reliability of the dichotomous (i.e., check/no check) version
of the blunting scale. Recent investigations, (e.g., Petersson et al. [27]) have found only the ‘‘monitoring’’
scale of the MBSS to have predictive validity. Fogel
[28] has illustrated a successful application of the
‘‘Brief Cope’’ scale, which includes subscales on denial
and self-distraction akin to MBSS blunting items.
More recent researchers of fear appeals (e.g., Dillard
[29], O’Keefe [30], Stephenson and Witte [31], and Witte [32]) have teased out distinctions in the way that
people evaluate information directed at them in public
campaigns. Attempts to control danger operate in parallel with the way people manage their fears and anxJ Med Libr Assoc 93(3) July 2005

iety. They may protect themselves from danger by accepting suggestions for avoiding disease, or they may
obviate their fear by rejecting the advice entirely as
ineffective or too difficult to carry out. How people
assess threatening messages is determined by several
factors that have to do with the nature of the hazard
itself, their perceptions of the effectiveness of responses to the threat (response efficacy), and their beliefs
about their own ability to carry out effective responses
(self-efficacy). High anxiety coupled with feelings of
low self-efficacy are likely to invoke fear-control responses like denial, anger, guilt, or hopelessness [1].
FROM CERTAINTY TO AMBIGUITY
The assumption of seeking knowledge is embedded in
theories of uncertainty reduction, as several communication scholars [33–36] have pointed out. Their basic
idea is that humans have a drive to reduce uncertainty
to make the world more predictable [37, 38]. Learning
facts about an issue of relevance increases certainty
and thus reduces the tension created by the hypothesized drive.
Much of the current information-seeking literature
is still based on the centrality of uncertainty reduction.
Kuhlthau [5], for example, emphasizes that ‘‘uncertainty due to a lack of understanding . . . initiates the process of information seeking.’’ Some, also like Kuhlthau,
acknowledge that information does not always reduce
uncertainty.
In discussions of information seeking, uncertainty is
typically tied to feelings of anxiety. So acquiring information is to be desired not merely for its instrumental value (i.e., ‘‘doing something’’ about a potential threat), but also for its emotional value (e.g., feeling
assured that the threat is not imminent). Reducing uncertainty helps us not only maximize future outcomes
[21, 22], but also guards against emotional stress [39].
Seeking information may serve both of these functions
simultaneously [20, 40].
But as Sorrentino [18] points out, much of the literature on uncertainty reduction emphasizes either the
benefits (particularly long-term) of having new information (e.g., for assessing one’s self or planning future
behavior) or the costs of information (e.g., being forced
to acknowledge threats or personal failings). Few theorists consider both costs and benefits in their examples.
Problematic Integration Theory [41] and Uncertainty
Management Theory [42, 43] question the assumption
that humans are always reducing uncertainty. Uncertainty Management Theory, in particular, offers a more
sophisticated way of explaining avoidance, because it
highlights how people sometimes deliberately increase
uncertainty. Uncertainty Management Theory holds
that uncertainty is experienced ‘‘not simply as an uncomfortable tension demanding reduction’’ [34], but
also as feelings and cognitions that can be managed
in other ways as well. These other ways may include
‘‘seeking instead ambiguity and even confusion’’ [34],
because ‘‘individuals may use uncertainty as a tool . . .
355
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Figure 1
Wilson’s model of ‘‘information behaviour’’

sometimes this cognitive state will be cultivated, rather
than eradicated’’ [34].
To foreshadow our discussion below, two examples
of the deliberate increasing of uncertainty are found
in situations where a physician must deliver a threatening diagnosis to a patient. One party to the dyad,
the physician, might choose to provide an uncertaintyincreasing message in the belief that the patient is certain of bad news [43]. The patient, in turn, might avoid
information to maintain uncertainty or even seek out
uncertainty-increasing information [35]. In both cases,
increased uncertainty might actually provide some increase in comfort for the patient, even though in a way
that might compromise treatment.
Yet simply rejecting an opportunity to decrease uncertainty is probably more common than intentionally
increasing it. For example, Mckenzie [44] discusses the
case of pregnant women who would rather not know
what the gender of their child is and/or whether the
child possibly has (or runs a high risk for) a disease.
Their refusal to ask for or accept such information
from their physician often stems from a conscious decision not to place themselves in a position in which
they may need to make difficult choices (e.g., abortion)
or, in the case of determining gender, simply a wish
not to spoil a ‘‘surprise’’ at birth.
Before turning to a particular case of information
avoidance to illustrate our different emphasis in information-seeking research, we will examine two models
that deal explicitly with how individuals may not seek
information and when they may actively avoid learning
356

new things. How do discussions of information seeking portray avoidance of information?
RESULTS
How does the information-seeking literature
portray avoidance?
The information-seeking literature—most of it concerned with practical issues regarding the stages,
mechanisms, processes, channels, sources, and sometimes barriers that mediate information seeking—cites
relatively few behavioral theories [45, 46]. And given
that virtually all of this literature assumes that people
choose to seek information, the idea of avoiding information is rarely discussed. The notion of avoidance
more commonly appears in discussions of research
models [1, 4, 6, 47]. Among these, only Johnson’s and
Wilson’s information-seeking models explicitly discuss
mechanisms whereby people may avoid information.
In contrast, the other models tend to limit themselves
to the selection of certain information in preference to
other information.
A model of ‘‘information behaviour’’ by Wilson [6]
is the latest in a series of diagrams dating back to 1981.
Wilson identifies the factors in his model from literature in other fields, including ‘‘decision making, psychology, innovation, and health communication and
consumer research’’ [6]. Wilson’s complex model (Figure 1) invokes explicit theories at points to explain
why some needs prompt information seeking more so
than others (stress/coping theory, from psychology),
J Med Libr Assoc 93(3) July 2005
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Figure 2
Johnson’s Comprehensive Model of Information Seeking (CMIS)

why some sources of information are used more than
others (risk/reward theory, from consumer research),
and why people may, or may not, pursue a goal successfully, based on their perceptions of their own efficacy (social learning theory, from psychology).
Wilson’s ‘‘activating mechanisms’’ can be thought of
as motivators: What motivates a person to search for
information, how, and to what extent? These motivators are affected by intervening variables of five types:
psychological predispositions (e.g., tendency to be curious or averse to risk), demographic background (e.g.,
age or education), factors related to one’s social role
(e.g., role as a manager or a mother), environmental
variables (e.g., available resources), and characteristics
of the sources (e.g., accessibility and credibility).
An important aspect of Wilson’s model is that it explicitly recognizes avoidance behaviors in its references to psychological literature on coping and stress.
These behaviors are invoked immediately after a need
arises. The importance of this model is its recognition
that the typical ‘‘intervening variables’’ (psychological,
demographic, role-related, environmental, or source
characteristics) may not come into play, if the nature of
the need or the information needed to address it is too
threatening or stressful. Although Wilson does not discuss it in detail, a later ‘‘activating mechanism’’ also
contains a component that is relevant to avoidance:
self-efficacy as represented in Bandura’s [48] social
learning theory (more recently called the ‘‘Theory of
Planned Behavior’’). Similar to Johnson’s model, perceptions of self-efficacy are also related to avoidance
behaviors.
Johnson’s model, ‘‘the Comprehensive Model of Information Seeking’’ (CMIS), has been cited repeatedly
in reviews of the information-behavior literature (e.g.,
Case [49], Rice et al. [50], and Wilson [6]) and is parJ Med Libr Assoc 93(3) July 2005

ticularly helpful in understanding health-related information seeking—or avoidance. It contains seven factors under three headings. It is pictured as a quasicausal process that flows from left to right (Figure 2),
beginning with four ‘‘antecedent’’ factors. The significance of the components of Johnson’s model’s is not
obvious in its depiction but rather is explained in
depth in his writings.
In Johnson’s CMIS, the antecedent factors motivate
a person to seek information. The first two are
grouped together under the label of ‘‘background factors,’’ for example, ‘‘demographics’’ (i.e., one’s age,
gender, and ethnicity, along with socioeconomic variables like education, occupation, wealth, etc.). A background factor far more difficult to characterize is one’s
‘‘direct experience’’ in relation to the domain of interest. The concept of experience brings up issues of
knowledge representation and memory too complex to
consider here; suffice it to say that typically one starts
out knowing something—perhaps little or a great
deal—about the phenomenon of interest, as well as
about the ways one can find out information about it.
Thus, a key concept under the heading of experience
is the ‘‘social network’’ of the individual with an information need: ‘‘Who do I know who might know
the answer to my questions or know how to find out?’’
For example, Johnson focuses on information about
cancer, and thus a prime determinant of knowledge is:
‘‘Who do I know who has had cancer?’’ Because a majority of families are touched by the disease in some
way and because the occurrence of cancer in one member of the family often motivates other family members to seek information about treatment, cancer information has high levels of social significance.
Just as the first and second factors are grouped together, the third and fourth fall under the heading of
357
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‘‘personal relevance.’’ Most of the subtopics of this review fall under the personal relevance category, including fear, denial, avoidance, and ignoring of information. Personal relevance factors include ‘‘beliefs’’
about the topic invoked and the ‘‘salience’’ of information about it. Both depend on a person’s degree of
knowledge—or, conversely, their state of ignorance—
about the topic, and both indirectly invoke the issue
of avoiding information.
Johnson says that ‘‘ignoring . . . happens when an
individual consciously knows that a problem exists,
but chooses not to confront it’’ [1]. Mere ignorance, by
itself, is not typically a motivator for information seeking. People are only motivated to seek information
when they both know that they are ignorant and the
missing information becomes salient. As we explore
below, sometimes people prefer to be ignorant, particularly in matters of health. A confounding problem is
that people sometimes believe information that turns
out to be flawed. These kinds of false truths can suppress or distort information seeking.
The concept of salience implies that information is
not only perceived to be relevant to a need, but that it
is also applicable to a person’s concerns. Thus, salience
is the key motivator in deciding to look for information
[1]. Beliefs are important in information seeking because they constrain the individual’s thinking and level of motivation regarding information seeking: the beliefs that a person has about the world and answers to
questions like: ‘‘Is there a problem?’’ ‘‘Is there a solution?’’ and ‘‘Can I change my situation?’’ Beliefs are
not only about facts, but also about our relation to the
current situation, in other words, people’s degree of
control over events, their self-efficacy. If people do not
believe that knowing more about a topic will allow
them to effect a change, then they are not likely to seek
information. Conversely, feeling that they can solve a
problem will motivate them to find the means to do
so—which includes information.
The second column of Johnson’s model, ‘‘information-carrier factors,’’ encompasses the factors that have
preoccupied many older studies of information seeking: the ‘‘characteristics’’ and ‘‘utility’’ of the information channels seekers select and use. As Johnson
highlights [1], what information seekers are concerned
about is the content of the information, not the channel
through which it arrives. However, people have a
strong preference for information that comes directly
from other people. Use of other channels tends to be
predicted by the social presence they offer, that is, how
much they are perceived as being like a face-to-face
conversation with another person or, as Johnson puts
it, ‘‘the extent to which they reveal the presence of
other human interactants and can capture the human,
feeling side of relationships’’ [1].
Regarding the utility of channels, Johnson says that
they are selected on the basis of their match with the
seeker’s needs and expectations regarding likely satisfactions to be obtained. Potential utility is equated
with ‘‘interest, usefulness and importance for achieving one’s goals’’ [1]. Johnson cites studies suggesting
358

that ease of accessibility often wins out over authoritativeness (the latter implying better utility).
The final components of Johnson’s model are ‘‘information-seeking actions.’’ Searches for information
involve conscious choices among channels and sources
but also imply processes, feelings, and a whole host
of other behavioral and cognitive elements. Johnson
notes that among the more general difficulties inherent
in studying the actions people take when they look for
information is a distinction between active and passive
acquisition. It is difficult, if not impossible, to know
whether someone has sought and found information
in their environment (active acquisition) or, instead,
been exposed to it in a public service announcement
while watching television for other reasons (passive acquisition).
Models for studying avoidance of threatening
health information
These new models of information seeking by Wilson
and Johnson have explicitly addressed the issue of information avoidance, each in a different way. Both the
Wilson and Johnson models address relevant aspects
of empirical findings on health-related information
seeking (below). This is particularly true of the Johnson model, because it has been developed with cancer
information seeking in mind. Both models allow for a
decision (conscious or unconscious) to avoid information, and both incorporate the concepts of anxiety and
self-efficacy as motivating or inhibiting factors.
Wilson’s model depicts anxiety as the initial ‘‘activating mechanism’’ that determines whether one decides to pursue information, in which case, other ‘‘intervening’’ variables may come into play. In Johnson’s
model, emotions like fear and actions like denial or
‘‘ignoring’’ information are found among the ‘‘personal relevance factors.’’ In both models, self-efficacy
plays a key role in the decision to seek information. In
Wilson’s model, the self-efficacy concept is explicitly
invoked, while in Johnson’s model, it is subsumed under individual judgments of the salience of information.
We will now consider how information avoidance
occurs in one area of human behavior, learning about
cancer, and the implications for research on that topic.
An example: avoiding information about cancer
A focus on the avoidance of information contrasts with
the emphasis of most information-campaign research.
Much of the (especially early) literature on health information overemphasizes human rationality and efficiency in information seeking (e.g., see the reviews in
Rice and Atkin [51, 52]). Yet as Rimal and Real [53]
indicate, the ‘‘self-protective’’ aspects of information
seeking tend to be neglected in the health literature.
Public health professionals recognize that encouraging
safe practices by emphasizing potentially harmful effects may be ‘‘tuned out’’ by readers, viewers, and listeners who simply ‘‘would rather not know.’’ This issue is increasingly critical, because the health consumJ Med Libr Assoc 93(3) July 2005

Avoiding versus seeking

erism movement has placed responsibility for decision
making in the hands of individuals. That makes examining the role of information seeking in regard to
health matters even more important to reduce morbidity and mortality.
Perhaps no health problem results in as much anxiety as facing the threat of cancer. Cancer is especially
difficult to cope with because it is represented by a
variety of diseases and stages. It is also a threat of
almost mythic dimensions: virtually everyone knows
someone who has had and perhaps has even died of
cancer. The mass media are filled with reports about
cancer and its victims.
Avoiding information is closely linked to feelings of
anxiety and fear, as well as to other cognitive and
emotional variables like perceptions of treatment efficacy, self-efficacy, and locus of control (the degree to
which one’s fate is governed externally versus controlled by one’s self). While information is often
thought of as reducing anxiety, such is not always the
case. A recent study of the effects of a consumer health
information service [54] found that 52% of the people
who received information said that it reduced their
anxiety about a health concern; yet for another 10%,
having the medical information increased their anxiety.
While 10% is a modest percentage, it at least indicates
that receiving more information does not have the
same positive results for everyone.
Raised anxiety is tied to perceptions of efficacy in
several ways. Anxiety is related to individual beliefs
in the efficacy of medical procedures associated with
cancer [55, 56]. That portion of the population who
(rightly or wrongly) believe that a diagnosis of cancer
means certain death and uncontrollable pain [57] tend
to feel powerless in regard to cancer [58, 59]. While
many treatments are becoming steadily more efficacious, cancers (e.g., of the lung) remain for which effective treatments are limited. Feelings of powerlessness, in turn, lead to less information seeking, because
many feel it does not make much sense to learn more
about things over which they have no control [60].
A related variable is locus of control, as distinct
from self-efficacy. Self-efficacy depends more on the
context of a situation, while locus of control is more a
personality trait that crosses situations [55]. According
to Bandura [48, 61], individuals’ sense of locus of control affects their feelings of self-efficacy. If one feels
that outcomes in life are determined by factors external to the self, then searching for information is relatively futile. In that situation, avoiding information
may become a more attractive response to threat.
Lack of information seeking when faced with disease appears irrational, because this is when information could be most beneficial and result in reduced
morbidity and mortality [1, 62]. Yet studies indicate
that people are less likely to look for information as
their proximity to cancer increases. Patients with cancer may be less likely to look for information, even
though their situation calls for more information [63].
Tendencies toward fatalism and avoidance can short
circuit any information seeking at all.
J Med Libr Assoc 93(3) July 2005

Cancer genetics as an area for studying information
avoidance
Genetic research offers many new avenues to address
issues of predisposition for cancer and to identify early onset of the disease, so that treatment can be more
effective and less invasive. Genetic screening is
thought to have the potential for transforming how
cancer may be treated as well as prevented [64]. However, genetic counseling and testing is necessary to fulfill this promise to increase prevention and recovery
from cancer through an early warning system.
But genetic information is inherently complex and
individualistic, and ongoing research is constantly
adding to the volume and variety of available information. This complexity means that an individual
must be knowledgeable about the nature of genetics
before they can even use such data—whether general
or individualized—to make decisions about their own
health situation. Thus, informing the public about cancer-related genetics information offers special challenges because of the complexity of the health issues involved and because of the ever-evolving body of scientific knowledge [65].
A significant portion of the US public is interested
in genetics and genetic testing and recognizes that
these advances can affect their health care decisions.
In a recent national survey [66], more than a third of
adults said they had followed the developments leading to the mapping of the human genome. Nearly twothirds of the respondents said that they were likely to
take a genetic test if it could identify whether or not
they were at risk of contracting a disease.
Other studies in the scientific literature support
these general findings. For instance, a general population survey found high levels of interest in genetic
testing (82%) [67]. Regarding cancer genetics, Andrykowski et al. [68] again found high interest in predictive genetic testing for cancer in general (87%), and
breast cancer in particular (93%). Our survey research
among 886 adult residents of a southeastern state [69]
found that 38% worried about inherited types of cancer ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘sometimes’’ and that 59% said they
would definitely or probably have a screening test if
it were available to them.
While these results suggest significant demand for
genetic testing and related information, they may overestimate the demand for such information. The medical literature shows cases of increased anxiety [70, 71],
depression [72, 73], and other psychosocial responses
to genetic testing. Given the possibility for such negative scenarios, it is understandable why people may
choose not to seek genetic testing and may simply be
content with their current situations [70]. Alpert [74]
points out that the ‘‘right not to know’’ is a compelling
issue for genetic testing when diseases (such as
Huntington’s) are involved for which neither cures nor
preventative measures exist. In such cases, it is not
only a matter of who is tested but with whom they
share the results. Some family members may not want
to know the results of their relative’s test.
359
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Repeated studies of cancer patients find a core, albeit a minority, who do not want information under
any circumstances [75, 76]. Studies have found that
anxiety levels are higher among those who decline to
be tested than those who get either a positive or negative result [77]. Given the advances in genetic research about cancer, it is important to understand the
mechanism of information avoidance to best reach
people who may benefit from genetic counseling or
testing.
CONCLUSION
We suggest that the avoidance of information from genetic testing for cancer is a prime area that communication and information science research can focus on.
We view the concept of information avoidance as related to, but not synonymous with, earlier concepts
invoked in investigations of selective exposure, ignorance, cognitive consistency, fear appeals, uncertainty
reduction, uncertainty management, coping, and monitoring and blunting behaviors.
We have advanced the case that over the years researchers have, in different ways and with different
terminology, spotlighted the human tendency to
avoid, ignore, and/or deny information, particularly in
the context of health care. We also suggest that such
tendencies have been relatively underemphasized in
preference to a focus on active seeking and monitoring
of information.
The issue of whether individuals will choose to
seek—or rather ignore—genetic testing is an ideal vehicle for exploring information avoidance and related
behaviors. Genetic testing offers a choice between opting to know one’s risks or deliberately ignoring them.
This makes it a fertile bed for developing theory. We
can, for example, explore the varying circumstances
that may lead to avoidance: by type and severity of
potential disease, by estimated likelihood of contracting a condition, and by the usual demographic factors.
We anticipate looking at these factors empirically
through surveys of medical patients who might benefit
from genetic testing and counseling and surveys of
large samples of the general public. These investigations will be designed to examine factors that may affect or impede genetics information seeking, ranging
from the relationship of various background or socioeconomic factors to the complex (and at times paradoxical) behavior of those most directly confronted
with illness. Ultimately, our goal is to develop interventions (as outlined in Johnson et al. [78]) that are
tailored to individuals’ information-seeking style to
help them become more self-sufficient, lifelong information seekers.
Obviously, genetic testing also has tremendous practical implications. Information seeking is a key moderator between perceived threats of disease, including
genetic predisposition, and the likelihood of taking action, including genetic counseling or testing (see Johnson et al. [78]). The scope and nature of the information on which to base medical judgments, the reper360

toire of alternative courses of action known to the
searcher, and ultimately the action taken are all affected by individuals’ information-seeking behaviors. Because the health consumerism movement has placed
responsibility for decision making in the hands of individuals, examining the role of information seeking
in regard to genetic testing is even more important.
The dearth of cancer genetics counselors only exacerbates this problem, because the availability of their advice directly affects the efficacy levels of patients. Similarly, physicians and other primary care providers can
influence patient decisions related to genetics but may
lack the necessary skills for communicating risk and
other critical information.
Patients could clearly benefit from genetic testing information, because early detection of cancer leads to
earlier treatments and better treatment outcomes.
Knowledge about testing, hopefully, will increase the
cancer cure rate, one of the ultimate goals of the National Cancer Institute [64, 79]. In keeping with that
goal, a better understanding of human tendencies to
avoid information in general, and genetic information
in particular, needs to be developed.
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